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TWO CHEERS FOR FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
Mark L. Movsesian*
THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
(F.H. Buckley ed., 1999) (Duke University Press, 461 pp.)
Once, they say, freedom of contract reigned in American law.
Parties could make agreements on a wide variety of subjects and
choose the terms they wished.' Courts would refrain from
questioning the substance of bargains and would ensure only that
parties had observed the proper formalities.2 In interpretation,
objectivity was paramount.' Courts would seek to ascertain, not
what the parties had intended, but what a reasonable observer
would understand the parties' words to mean.' Contract law was a
series of abstractions informed by individual autonomy and
judicial deference.'
This world, a classical paradise of doctrines with sharp
corners, began to disappear in the mid-twentieth century, a victim
of legal realism and its successors in the academy.6 Legislatures
* Professor of Law, Hofstra University. I thank Janet Dolgin, Peter Linzer, Greg
Maggs, John McGinnis, Larry Ribstein, and Marshall Tracht for thoughtful comments and
Connie Lenz of the Deane Law Library at Hofstra for helpful research assistance. I am
also grateful for the assistance of Rebecca Sullivan, Hofstra Law School Class of 2002. 1
wrote this essay while a visiting research fellow at the Institute of United States Studies at
the University of London. Hofstra University provided a grant in support. I thank both
institutions.
I See, e.g., W. DAVID SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISES 12-16 (1996) (describing United
States Supreme Court jurisprudence at the turn of the twentieth century).
2 See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 15 (1974); Friedrich Kessler,
Introduction: Contract as a Principle of Order to FRIEDRICH KESSLER, GRANT GILMORE
& ANTHONY M. KRONMAN, CONTRACTS 7-8 (3d ed. 1986), reprinted in A CONTRACTS
ANTHOLOGY 32,34-35 (Peter Linzer ed., 2d ed. 1995).
3 See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law, 88
CAL. L. REV. 1743, 1756-57 (2000).
4 See Hotchkiss v. Nat'l City Bank of N.Y., 200 Fed. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) (Hand,
J.), aff'd, 201 F. 664 (2d Cir. 1912), affd, 231 U.S. 50 (1913); see also SLAWSON, supra note
1, at 20-21; Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 1756-57.
5 On the abstract nature of classical contract law, see, for example, GILMORE, supra
note 2, at 13, and Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 1749.
6 See Charles L. Knapp, Rescuing Reliance: The Perils of Promissory Estoppel, 49
HASTINGS L.J. 1191, 1193-94, 1198 (1998) (discussing classical contract law and the
1529
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW
limited the scope of contract by enacting social welfare and
consumer protection statutes.7 Courts began to police the fairness
of agreements, developing new doctrines like unconscionability
that allowed them to intervene to protect parties with unequal
bargaining power.8  When it came to interpretation, courts
discounted the apparent certainty of contract language and
focused on what the parties had actually meant.' Contract law
became more egalitarian and more subjective.10
But we live in a new day. Twenty-five years after Grant
Gilmore famously declared it "dead," freedom of contract is
experiencing a revival in American law.1 The bargain principle
has proven remarkably durable, now extending beyond traditional
contracts to govern institutions, like marriage, that once were
grounded in status.12 Courts again refrain from challenging the
substance of parties' agreements, and interpretation again
emphasizes the written language.13 These developments reflect a
new formalism that promises (or threatens) to restore the
libertarian virtues of contract's classical past.4
criticisms of legal realists); Ralph James Mooney, The New Conceptualism in Contract
Law, 74 OR. L. REV. 1131, 1132-33 (1995).
7 See Mark Pettit, Jr., Freedom, Freedom of Contract, and the "Rise and Fall", 79 B.U.
L. REV. 263, 265 (1999); see also SLAWSON, supra note 1, at 43, 90.
8 See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965); see
also SLAWSON, supra note 1, at 140-44 (discussing unconscionability doctrine); James
Gordley, The Common Law in the Twentieth Century: Some Unfinished Business, 88 CAL.
L. REV. 1815, 1820 (2000) (noting how twentieth-century judges have expanded the
doctrine of unconscionability).
9 See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d
641, 643-44 (Cal. 1968); Arthur L. Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol
Evidence Rule, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 161,164 (1964).
1o See Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 1757-58; Mooney, supra note 6, at 1132, 1160.
11 GILMORE, supra note 2, at 3. Gilmore occasionally exaggerated for effect and
expected his readers to appreciate his irony, see Peter Linzer, Law's Unity-An Essay for
the Master Contortionist, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 183, 183-84 & n.2 (1995); see also Daniel
Farber, The Ages of American Formalism, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 89, 90 (1995) (arguing that
Gilmore's subject was not contract law so much as the psychology of law genefally),
something that scholars sometimes have failed to do. See Robert A. Hillman, The
Triumph of Gilmore's The Death of Contract, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 32, 32 (1995) (discussing
critics' condemnation of book). In any event, The Death of Contract has remained a
remarkably influential work. See, e.g., Symposium, Reconsidering Grant Gilmore's The
Death of Contract, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 1 (1995).
12 See Kessler, supra note 2, at 17, reprinted in A CONTRACTS ANTHOLOGY, supra
note 2, at 38; see also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of
Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 211 (1995) (stating that bargain principle is basic element
of contract law). On the influence of contract principles in contemporary marriage law,
see infra text accompanying notes 81, 150-54.
13 Mooney, supra note 6, at 1170, 1189.
14 On the new formalism in contract law, see, for example, David Charny, The New
Formalism in Contract, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 842, 842-43 (1999); Mooney, supra note 6, at
1133-35; see also Randy E. Barnett, The Richness of Contract Theory, 97 MICH. L. REV.
1413, 1414-15 (1999) (book review).
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This is the conventional account of American contract law.
Like most such accounts, it gets many things right and some things
quite wrong." A recent collection of essays, The Fall and Rise of
Freedom of Contract,16 explores the accuracies and flaws in the
conventional story and reflects on the continuing vitality of
freedom of contract. 7 Many of the essays, contributed by some of
today's most prominent scholars, come from a law-and-economics
perspective, but the book is not unreflective or triumphalist.1
8
Taken together, the essays offer useful insights into the capacity of
the bargain principle to withstand the critiques of the last century
and the principle's adaptability in areas as diverse as tort law,19
zoning law,20 family law,2' bankruptcy law," and conflict of laws.
One cannot do justice to all these topics in a short essay.
Instead, I will concentrate on two areas, marriage and conflict of
laws, and discuss the ways in which freedom of contract can make
useful contributions to both.24 In addition, I will address an
overarching question that Fall and Rise provokes. Is it really
correct to speak of freedom of contract's contemporary
"revival"? 25 To do so implies both that freedom of contract had
gone into eclipse and that its present victory over rival concepts is
more or less complete. Neither proposition is true.26 Today as
always freedom of contract coexists with other, competing
principles that stress substantive fairness and overriding social
values.27 It seems fruitless to argue long about which of these
many principles expresses the essence of contract law.28 The better
15 For example, contemporary contract interpretation is less formal and more
subjective than the conventional account suggests. See infra text accompanying notes 57-
61.
16 THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999)
[hereinafter FALL AND RISE].
17 See, e.g., F.H. Buckley, Introduction to FALL AND RISE, supra note 16, at 23.
18 On the law-and-economics orientation of most of the essays, see id. at 2.
19 FALL AND RISE, supra note 16, at 119-56.
20 Id. at 157-200.
21 Id. at 201-79.
22 Id. at 281-324.
23 Id. at 325-86.
24 See infra text accompanying notes 81-122 (discussing marriage), 123-41 (discussing
conflict of laws).
25 Buckley, supra note 17, at 2.
26 See, e.g., Pettit, supra note 7, at 300-52 (demonstrating that even in the nineteenth
century courts recognized public policies that tempered freedom of contract).
27 See ROBERT A. HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW 1-3, 7, 267 (1997);
Kessler, supra note 2, at 2, 17, reprinted in A CONTRACTS ANTHOLOGY, supra note 2, at
32, 38; Pettit, supra note 7, at 352. For further discussion of this point, see infra text
accompanying notes 143-56.
28 See HILLMAN, supra note 27, at 268; see also Dennis M. Patterson, The
Philosophical Origins of Modem Contract Doctrine: An Open Letter to Professor James
Gordley, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 1432, 1436. For a contrary view on the usefulness of grand
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part of wisdom, as Morris Cohen suggested many years ago, lies in
accepting the complexity. 29
Part I of Fall and Rise addresses the first of the book's two
central themes. After decades of judicial and scholastic scorn,
freedom of contract remains a fundamental principle of American
contract law. What explains this remarkable success? In an
interesting essay, Richard Epstein provides an answer: realist
critiques of the bargain principle were never as radical as they
seemed.30  By and large, the disputes between realists and
classicists concerned marginal issues that did not threaten the
centrality of freedom of contract. 3' For example, the much-touted
doctrine of promissory estoppel, which allowed parties who had
detrimentally relied on promises to recover even in the absence of
bargain, did not "compromise the enforcement of fully executory"
agreements in the commercial setting.32 The bargain requirement
still obtained with respect to "sales, leases, mortgages,
partnerships, hire, and countless other collaborative
arrangements[.] ' ' 3 The realists had merely added a new "route[]
to promissory liability. '34
Similarly, the debate over social welfare legislation was
exaggerated. Realists and classicists disagreed about which
circumstances called for regulation, but they agreed that public
policy concerns could override freedom of contract in appropriate
cases. 35 Laissez-faire courts believed, for example, that common
carriers and public utilities could not enjoy the same freedom of
contract as providers that lacked monopoly power.36 Even with
regard to interpretation, the differences between realists and
classicists were relatively minor.37 Classical contract law endorsed
a "traditional mix between subjective and objective" approaches;38
theories in contract law, see Barnett, supra note 14, at 1419-21.
29 Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 591 (1933).
30 Richard A. Epstein, Contracts Small and Contracts Large: Contract Law Through
the Lens of Laissez-Faire, in FALL AND RISE, supra note 16, at 25, 26.
31 See id.
32 Id. at 45-46.
33 Id. at 46.
34 Id. Epstein makes similar points with respect to the moral obligation doctrine,
another realist inroad on consideration. See id. at 45-46.
35 See id. at 58-60. For an example of a classicist critique of freedom of contract, see
Samuel Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 365,374,379 (1921).
36 See Epstein, supra note 30, at 60.
37 See id. at 35-38.
38 Id. at 37.
1532 [Vol. 23:4
2002] TWO CHEERS FOR FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 1533
in any event, as the market itself typically acts to minimize the
potential for errors in communication, disputes about interpretive
methods have only "limited institutional significance.""
Many of Epstein's arguments ring true, and other contributors
to Fall and Rise elaborate on them. For example, Gregory
Alexander explores the willingness of laissez-faire courts to uphold
legislative limitations on freedom of contract in the law of
insurance and common carriers.40 Even in the labor context,
laissez-faire courts endorsed regulations that they believed
necessary to protect vulnerable employees like sailors, women,
and children.41 Cases like Lochner v. New York," which famously
struck down the regulation of working conditions in bakeries,43
reflect only part of classical contract law: courts also recognized
communitarian principles that justified restraints on the free
market."
Similarly, Michael Trebilcock agrees with Epstein that the
debates between classicists and realists concerned only marginal
doctrinal issues. Indeed, in Trebilcock's view, the disputes
"amount to little more than clubhouse squabbles among
teammates. 45 Trebilcock does fault Epstein for not addressing the
larger conflict between freedom of contract and social regulation
that informs all of contract law.46  Trebilcock himself reviews
39 Id. As an example, Epstein cites Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ex.
1864), the famous "Peerless" dispute. The case concerned the sale of cotton, to be
transported from Bombay to Liverpool on the ship "Peerless." Id. Although there were
two ships by that name that sailed from Bombay to Liverpool at different times, the
parties' agreement did not specify which Peerless would transport the cotton. The buyer
refused to pay for the cotton on the ground that it had arrived on the wrong ship, and the
seller brought suit for breach. Id. at 375. The court ruled for the buyer, apparently
accepting counsel's argument that "there was no consensus ad idem, and therefore no
binding contract." Id. at 376.
Scholars have long debated whether the case reflects an objective or subjective
approach. See Epstein, supra note 30, at 37 & n.59. Epstein explains, however, that cotton
traders eventually developed a futures market in which contracts were keyed to the
cargo's anticipated arrival date, thus eliminating the problem that had occurred in the
"Peerless" case. See id. at 37-38; see also A.W. Brian Simpson, Contracts for Cotton to
Arrive: The Case of the Two Ships Peerless, 11 CARDOZO L. REv. 287, 313 (1989)
(discussing this development). For further discussion of the "Peerless" case, see, for
example, E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.9, at 459, 463-64 (3d ed. 1999), and
Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 1759.
40 See Gregory S. Alexander, The Limits of Freedom of Contract in the Age of Laissez-
Faire Constitutionalism, in FALL AND RISE, supra note 16, at 103, 108.
41 See id. at 113-18.
42 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
43 Id. at 53.
44 See Alexander, supra note 40, at 105, 118.
45 Michael J. Trebilcock, External Critiques of Laissez-Faire Contract Values, in FALL
AND RISE, supra note 16, at 78-79.
46 Id. at 79.
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several aspects of this conflict-information failures,
externalities ,48 "commodification, '' 49 and paternalism5°--and shows
that the debate between private ordering and public control does
not admit of a general solution. What is required, he writes, is
"debating and contesting issues both normatively and empirically,
category by category and case by case."51
Epstein's argument about interpretation, however, is not so
persuasive. Classical contract interpretation was not so
freewheeling as Epstein suggests; the Restatement of Contracts
adopted a rigorously objective approach, a fact that Epstein notes
in an aside. 2 Indeed, objectivity played an essential role in
preserving the judicial neutrality that classicism prized. 3 Just as a
court should not question the substance of a bargain, classicists
believed, a court should not rewrite an agreement to make it
better reflect the parties' intent.54 In the long run, judicial
intervention would create incentives for carelessness and poor
drafting that would undercut the predictability of transactions.5
Classical interpretation thus scorned subjective
understandings: the apparent meaning of the parties' language
would control even when one could demonstrate that the parties
had shared a contrary intent 6.5  The "traditional mix between
subjective and objective" approaches that Epstein describes is
largely a realist innovation 7.5  The realists endorsed party
autonomy and believed that courts should honor agreements.
47 Id. at 82-86.
41 Id. at 86-88.
49 Id. at 88-90.
50 Id. at 90-92.
51 Id. at 93.
52 Epstein, supra note 30, at 36 & n.52. For discussions of the objectivity of classical
contract interpretation, see Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 1756-57, and Stephen F. Ross &
Daniel Tranen, The Modern Parol Evidence Rule and Its Implications for New Textualist
Statutory Interpretation, 87 GEO. L.J. 195, 200-02 (1998). For examples of the
Restatement's approach, see RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 71, 230 (1932).
53 See, e.g., Michael P. Van Alstine, Of Textualism, Party Autonomy, and Good Faith,
40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1223, 1234 (1999) (discussing how classical contract
interpretation sought to eliminate judicial discretion).
54 See II SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 610, at 1176 n.31 (1920);
see also Peter Nash Swisher, Judicial Interpretations of Insurance Contract Disputes:
Toward a Realistic Middle Ground Approach, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 543, 546-47 (1996)
(discussing Williston's approach to interpretation).
55 See Mark L. Movsesian, Are Statutes Really "Legislative Bargains"? The Failure of
the Contract Analogy in Statutory Interpretation, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1145, 1161 (1998)
(discussing this argument).
56 See 11 WILLISTON, supra note 54, § 610, at 1176-77, § 611, at 1179-80; see also
Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 1757.
57 Epstein, supra note 30, at 37.
58 See Eric A. Posner, The Decline of Formality in Contract Law, in FALL AND RISE,
supra note 16, at 61, 71-72 (discussing Cardozo and Corbin).
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They were not as concerned as classicists about the problem of
judicial overreaching, however, and believed that courts could
uncover subjective intent without damaging the security of
transactions 9.5  Accordingly, they argued, if one could show that
the parties had shared an intent at odds with their written
agreement, the subjective intent should prevail.60 As Epstein
correctly notes, contemporary contract interpretation has adopted
this approach.61
In his contribution to Part I of Fall and Rise, Eric Posner
recognizes that subjectivity plays a larger role in interpretation
than it did during the classical period.62 Indeed, he points out,
contract law generally is less formal today than it was 100 years
ago.63 Although the bargain principle has persisted, it cannot
explain many contemporary doctrines.' Posner points out that
"an odd system of parallel tracks now prevails. Courts apply
seriatim the doctrine of duress and the preexisting duty rule to
disputes over contract modifications; . . . the consideration
doctrine and promissory estoppel to disputes over firm offers and
gratuitous promises; and so on. ' 65
What caused this decline of formalism in contract law?
Posner persuasively argues that the change was not the result of
any antipathy to the market.66 Realists like Llewellyn believed
that their reforms would bolster the market; the UCC's "solicitude
for established business practices amounted to a paean to freedom
of contract. ' 67 Posner admits that the shift from formalism might
be explained by courts' increased confidence in their ability to
determine parties' intentions and to police bargains for coercion
and fraud.68 He ultimately rejects that explanation, however, in
favor of one that focuses on judges' interest in their reputations.69
59 See Movsesian, supra note 55, at 1165-66.
60 See Corbin, supra note 9, at 164 (arguing that the goal of interpretation "is the
ascertainment of the intention of the parties (their meaning), and not the meaning that the
written words convey.., to any third persons"); Ross & Tranen, supra note 52, at 202-04
(discussing Corbin's views).
61 Epstein, supra note 30, at 36; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
201(1) (1981). On the subjectivity of contemporary contract interpretation, see Eisenberg,
supra note 3, at 1758, 1759-60, and Movsesian, supra note 55, at 1162-67.
62 See Posner, supra note 58, at 65, 71.
63 See id. at 65-66.
64 See id. at 65.
65 Id.
66 See id. at 63, 69, 77.
67 Id. at 70.
(8 See id. at 70-71. Posner refers to this explanation as a decline of the "deference
thesis," and he links it to the same confidence in governmental institutions that gave rise
to the administrative state. Id. at 66, 70, 77-78.
69 See id. at 72-78.
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Judges develop good reputations by deciding cases--or at least
appearing to do so-on the basis of precedent rather than the
judges' personal beliefs." Precedent may weaken over time,
however, and judges can subtly recharacterize doctrine in a
manner that allows them to advance their personal beliefs without
sacrificing their reputations.7 American contract law has followed
this pattern, as judges have gradually nudged the law away from
classical formalism.72
Of course, this account leaves open an important question.
Why did twentieth-century American judges want to move
contract law to greater informality? Posner dismisses as simplistic
the idea that judges were responding unreflectively to larger
political and economic trends.73 Judges might sense broader social
movements, he writes, but only as "distant echo[es]."74 The better
explanation is that the shift to informality was a more-or-less
random event, a result of the chance occurrence that realist-
leaning judges were on the bench at a certain moment in history.75
"On this theory," Posner states, "the decline of formality, like the
rise of formality before it, was just a long-term accident, and may
be reversed in the future."76
Posner is correct that a description of doctrinal change should
take into account judges' interest in their reputations.77 But his
depiction of the shift to informality as an essentially random event
is unpersuasive. Judges can increase their prestige, not simply by
appearing to follow precedent, but by deciding cases according to
theories that elites in the legal profession favor. If they reach
"good" results in high-profile cases, judges can receive praise in
bar committees, scholarly journals, and even the editorial pages.8
70 See id. at 73-74.
71 See id. at 75-76.
72 See id. at 76-78.
73 See id. at 76.
74 Id.
71 See id.
76 Id. at 78.
7 For discussions of the influence of reputation on judicial behavior, see, for example,
RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 117-18, 119 (1995), and Frederick Schauer,
Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants of Judicial Behavior, 68 U. CIN. L.
REV. 615, 627-31 (2000).
78 See Schauer, supra note 77, at 628-30 (discussing hypothesis that decisions of the
Supreme Court are influenced by Justices' wishes to increase their reputations with the
"mainstream elite press" and "elite law professors"). Schauer notes that law clerks are in
a position to apprise the Justices "of the current attitudes of young intellectuals, of law
professors, and of the intellectual classes in general." Id. at 628. For a good description of
how constitutional law has tracked twentieth-century intellectual trends, see John 0.
McGinnis, The Inevitable Infidelities of Constitutional Translation: The Case of the New
Deal, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 177, 196-207 (1999).
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If their opinions seem outside the "mainstream," by contrast,
judges can draw harsh criticism-in extreme cases, criticism that
limits the chance of appointment to higher positions on the
bench.79 In short, if one focuses on reputation, it is not at all
simplistic to maintain that judges' decisions will generally reflect
broader intellectual trends in the profession-in the context of
twentieth century contract law, trends in favor of the public
regulation of agreements. The conclusion follows directly from
Posner's theory.
A contemporary intellectual trend in favor of market ordering
may provide the basis for the second of Fall and Rise's central
themes: the extension of contract principles to other areas of law.
Parts II through VI of Fall and Rise cover several such areas. 80
One of the most interesting is marriage. Contract principles play a
much greater role in marriage law than they did a generation ago,
a development that has led critics to worry about the
commercialization of the institution.8' In an interesting essay,
Elizabeth and Robert Scott argue that the critics have focused on
the wrong sort of contract.82 The true model for marriage, they
believe, is not the one-shot transaction, but the so-called
"relational" contract.83 In a relational contract, the parties enter
into a long-term arrangement-a franchise or supply agreement,
for example-that necessarily leaves some terms open for future
delineation.84 Over time, the parties' behavior creates
79 See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 187-88
(2000); Boris I. Bitker, Interpreting the Constitution: Is the Intent of the Framers
Controlling? If Not, What Is?, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 9, 51-52 (1995); cf Barry
Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 612 (1993) (noting that
"the confirmation process for federal judges seems designed to ensure that judges are in
the mainstream of popular views").
80 See FALL AND RISE, supra note 16, at 119-56 (tort law), 157-200 (zoning law), 201-79
(family law), 281-324 (bankruptcy law), 325-86 (conflict of laws).
81 See, e.g., Bruce C. Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy in Family Law: The Waning
of Belonging, 1991 BYU L. REV. 1, 2, 25-28; Milton C. Regan, Jr., Market Discourse and
Moral Neutrality in Divorce Law, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 605, 608-09, 627-28, 641-42, 657,
681-84; see also Carol Weisbrod, The Way We Live Now: A Discussion of Contracts and
Domestic Arrangements, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 777, 777-79 (discussing criticisms). For more
on the role of contract principles in contemporary marriage law, see Janet L. Dolgin, The
Family in Transition: From Griswold to Eisenstadt and Beyond, 82 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1560
(1994).
82 See Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, A Contract Theory of Marriage, in FALL
AND RISE, supra note 16, at 201, 202.
83 See id. at 202, 209-10, 236. The Scotts had addressed this theme in an earlier piece.
Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REV.
1225 (1998).
84 See Richard E. Speidel, The Characteristics and Challenges of Relational Contracts,
94 Nw. U. L. REV. 823, 828-29 (2000). The academic literature on relational contract is
substantial, see, for example, Symposium, Relational Contract Theory: Unanswered
Questions, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 737 (2000), though the concept has had a limited impact on
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understandings---"relational norms"-that, together with wider
trade customs-"social norms"-fill in the gaps." Unlike a one-
shot transaction, a relational contract is characterized by
reciprocity and interdependence.86 Each party understands the
need to compromise and cooperate to further the collective good.87
The Scotts write that "marriage fits this model of contract
quite well, indeed." 8 Spouses make a long-term commitment to
one another, memorializing their agreement by the familiar vows
of fidelity.89 Over time, the spouses' daily interactions create
expectations that impart meaning to these vague terms; social
conventions about the way married people should behave towards
one another reinforce the spouses' reciprocal commitment.90
Although they are not subject to judicial enforcement-the Scotts
explain that courts lack the capacity to evaluate "the complex web
of behaviors known to and observable by the parties alone" 91-
these expectations and conventions provide the key ingredients
that hold the marital bargain together.92 The legal system comes
into play only to address "massive defections" from the norms that
result in termination of the agreement: divorce.93
The Scotts recognize that, compared to other relational
contracts, contemporary marriages seem "peculiarly prone to
fail."94 They believe that the law's failure to enforce "mandatory
commitment periods" has contributed greatly to marriage's
decline. 95  The Scotts argue that minimum duration terms-for
example, clauses that provide a two- or three-year waiting period
for divorce-can make marriages more stable by forestalling
disputes and encouraging cooperation between the parties.96 In
most states, however, courts will not enforce such terms: "[u]nder
courts and in mainstream contract theory. See Jay M. Feinman, Relational Contract
Theory in Context, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 737, 737, 744 (2000); Speidel, supra, at 824. For a
trenchant criticism of the relational contract model, see Melvin A. Eisenberg, Why There
Is No Law of Relational Contracts, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 805 (2000).
85 See Scott & Scott, supra note 82, at 210; see also Feinman, supra note 84, at 742
(discussing contract norms).
86 See Scott & Scott, supra note 82, at 210.
87 See Speidel, supra note 84, at 829.
88 Scott & Scott, supra note 82, at 210.
89 Id.
90 See id. at 228-32.
91 Id. at 232. In his contribution to this part of Fall and Rise, Trebilcock agrees with
this assessment. Michael J. Trebilcock, Marriage as a Signal, in FALL AND RISE, supra
note 16, at 245, 245.
92 Scott & Scott, supra note 82, at 210.
93 Id. at 202; see also id. at 234-35.
94 Id. at 244.
95 Id. at 216; see also id. at 203, 242-43, 244.
96 See id. at 215-18, 225-27. The Scotts also argue for a maximum duration term, after
which the parties could divorce without a waiting period. See id. at 217, 225.
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the unilateral no-fault rule, all marriages are functionally
terminable at will."97 This judicial refusal not only deprives parties
of a useful tool; it also contributes to the weakening of social
norms that reinforce marriage.9 The social sanctions for divorce
today are "relatively modest," the Scotts write, in part because of
the ease with which parties can legally exit the marital
relationship. 99 Thus, while public policy may mitigate against
"extremely inflexible" terms, 1°° such as those that flatly prohibit
divorce, courts should not nullify terms that merely make divorce
more difficult. 0 '
Many of these points are persuasive. For example, the Scotts
are right that marriage shares some characteristics of contract-
marriage begins with an exchange of promises, after all-and that
marriage resembles the relational model more than it does the
standard one-shot transaction. 102 The Scotts are right too that the
courts should avoid entangling themselves in the everyday
interactions of married couples; how could a court accurately
judge whether one spouse had breached the duty to do a fair share
of the household work? 3 Finally, the Scotts are right that refusing
to enforce promises never to divorce is consistent with contract
theory. As I demonstrate in more detail below, contract law
declines to enforce many sorts of promises on public policy
grounds." Given the anguish that a bad marriage can cause, and
the potential for physical and psychological abuse, enforcing
pledges never to divorce would impose an unacceptable social
97 Id. at 241. The famous Louisiana "covenant marriage" statute, see LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 9:272-9:275.1 (West 2000), which allows parties to limit the right to divorce by
imposing a two-year waiting period, is a notable exception. See Scott & Scott, supra note
82, at 201; see also James Herbie DiFonzo, Customized Marriage, 75 IND. L.J. 875, 882
(2000); Elizabeth S. Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 VA. L.
REV. 1901, 1902 n.1 (2000).
98 See Scott & Scott, supra note 82, at 243.
99 Id. at 237, 243.
100 Id. at 242.
1o' See id. at 217.
102 See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig & Steven M. Crafton, Marriage and Opportunism, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 869, 871 (1994) (noting that "marriage has many of the characteristics of
relational contracting"); Lloyd Cohen, Marriage, Divorce, and Quasi Rents; Or, "I Gave
Him the Best Years of My Life", 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 267, 271-72 (1987) (discussing ways in
which marriage can be understood as a peculiar kind of contract). For an early, seminal
discussion, see Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691,
720-21, 725 (1974).
103 See Katharine B. Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts and the Family Economy, 93 Nw. U.
L. REV. 65, 130-32 (1998) (discussing the difficulty of devising workable judicial standards
for evaluating non-monetary promises in a marriage contract); see also Trebilcock, supra
note 91, at 245 (agreeing with Scotts that "the law has a minimal role to play in directly
enforcing intramarital commitments").
104 See infra text accompanying notes 143-49.
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Nonetheless, one can make too much of the analogy between
marriages and relational contracts. 16  Despite the growing
influence of contract ideas, marriages have not been privatized to
the extent the Scotts suggest.107 As I explain below, courts subject
marriages to much more rigorous procedural and substantive
review than commercial contracts." 8  More fundamentally,
demonstrating that marriages are like relational contracts does not
solve the puzzle that the Scotts themselves identify: why are
contemporary marriages so much more likely to fail? The Scotts
argue that the courts' refusal to enforce mandatory commitment
periods is largely to blame, but a simpler explanation comes to
mind. Marriages fail so much more often than commercial
arrangements because marriages are so much more difficult.
Cohabitation and family responsibilities create emotional and
physical demands that are much greater than the sort one typically
finds in commercial settings.'09 Moreover, behavioral studies
suggest that there are centrifugal forces at the heart of marriage.
Men, whose marital prospects tend to increase as they become
wealthier and more established, have strong temptations to desert
their families to pursue new relationships with younger women.10
Of course, these factors have always existed. The key reason
for the instability of contemporary marriage, as the Scotts
themselves suggest, is the rapid disappearance of the social norms
that traditionally have supported the institution."1  The
105 See Robert M. Gordon, Note, The Limits of Limits on Divorce, 107 YALE L.J. 1435,
1449 (1998). Interestingly, recent studies show that the divorce of their parents heightens
the risk of sexual abuse for girls. See Robin Fretwell Wilson, Children At Risk- The Sexual
Exploitation of Female Children After Divorce, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 251,282 (2001).
"06 For interesting discussions of how the reciprocal obligations of marriage differ from
contract terms, see Ira Mark Ellman, "Contract Thinking" Was Marvin's Fatal Flaw, 76
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1365, 1373-75 (2001); Steven L. Nock, Time and Gender in
Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV. 1971, 1980-84, 1987 (2000).
107 See Scott & Scott, supra note 82, at 203-04 (discussing "pervasive" trend toward
private ordering in marriage law).
108 See Eric A. Posner, Family Law and Social Norms, in FALL AND RISE, supra note
16, at 256, 270; Regan, supra note 81, at 638; Silbaugh, supra note 103, at 74. For further
discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 150-154.
109 Cf Regan, supra note 81, at 645-49 (arguing that relational contract discourse does
not capture the "distinct kinds of obligations" that characterize marriage). For discussions
of the ways in which the reciprocal obligations of marriage differ from contract terms, see
Ellman, supra note 106, at 1373-75; Nock, supra note 106, at 1980-84, 1987.
110 See Cohen, supra note 102, at 284-87 (discussing studies).
I See Scott & Scott, supra note 82, at 212-13, 237-38. On the rapidity of the changes in
Americans' attitudes toward marriage, see Posner, supra note 108, at 273, and Janet L.
Dolgin, The Fate of Childhood: Legal Models of Children and the Parent-Child
Relationship, 61 ALB. L. REV. 345, 356 (1997). For an argument that cultural changes that
disfavor marriage can be traced back to the libertarian impulse of the Enlightenment, see
James Q. Wilson, Why We Don't Marry, CITY J. 46, 51 (Winter 2002).
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individualistic values of our society militate against binding marital
commitments.112 As the Scotts explain, "[i]n contemporary society,
couples can live together in intimate relationships without social
sanction."1 3 Divorce carries little, if any, stigma; even having and
raising children out of wedlock is increasingly accepted. "4 Given
Americans' growing indifference to the values it represents, it
should come as no surprise that marriage as a legal institution has
gone into decline.
As I have explained, the Scotts contend that allowing couples
to provide for mandatory commitment periods would help revive
social norms that favor marriage." This is an intriguing argument,
one that Elizabeth Scott has developed further in a subsequent
paper."6 One can envision something like the following dynamic.
Mandatory commitment periods would give married couples
greater incentives to cooperate and avoid unnecessary disputes;
they would also allow married couples time to "cool off" and resist
transitory impulses to divorce."7 As a result, marriages with
mandatory commitment periods would be significantly more stable
than marriages without them."8  Couples considering marriage
would come to appreciate this benefit and increasingly choose the
mandatory commitment option. Over time, stable marriages
would again become the norm, and divorce again an aberration.
One might be tempted to dismiss this scenario as overly
optimistic. America's individualistic values have led to lenient
divorce laws, not the other way around;" 9 if those values remain
112 See Scott & Scott, supra note 82, at 237-38; see also Patrick McKinley Brennan, Of
Marriage and Monks, Community and Dialogue, 48 EMORY L.J. 689, 714-15 (1999) (book
review); Hafen, supra note 81, at 2; Wilson, supra note 111, at 51, 53-54. The Scotts
correctly point out that "[wlithin some close-knit religious, ethnic, and geographical
communities, social norms continue to function effectively to promote marital stability."
Scott & Scott, supra note 82, at 237.
113 Scott & Scott, supra note 82, at 212.
114 On the disappearance of any stigma attached to divorce, see Amy L. Wax,
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market: Is There a Future for Egalitarian Marriage?, 84
VA. L. REv. 509, 549-50, 668 (1998). On the increasing social acceptance of raising
children out of wedlock, see Lloyd R. Cohen, Rhetoric, the Unnatural Family, and
Women's Work, 81 VA. L. REv. 2275, 2278 (1995), and Arland Thornton, Comparative
and Historical Perspectives on Marriage, Divorce, and Family Life, 1994 UTAH L. REv.
587, 596.
115 See Scott & Scott, supra note 82, at 242-43.
116 Scott, supra note 97.
117 See Scott & Scott, supra note 82, at 242-43; see also id. at 215-18, 225-27.
118 See Scott, supra note 97, at 1953-54.
"9 See Trebilcock, supra note 91, at 255; Margaret F. Brinig & F.H. Buckley, No-Fault
Laws and At-Fault People, 18 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 325, 334 (1998); see also Wilson,
supra note 111, at 50-51, 53-54.
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the same, legal reform may have only limited impact.1 21 Still,
making divorce more difficult might have some positive effect on
marriage norms, and the Scotts' proposal is worth a try.121 To be
sure, a two- or three-year waiting period for divorce would cause
hardship for some married couples, but, given society's interest in
greater marital stability, it would be a hardship that society could
fairly ask them to bear.1 22 Moreover, as the parties themselves had
voluntarily agreed to it, enforcement of a waiting period would not
violate their autonomy. In a paradoxical way, as the Scotts
suggest, allowing parties greater freedom of contract might help
restore a more communitarian version of marriage.
Another area in which contract principles have come to play a
greater role is conflict of laws.'23 Traditional conflict principles
disfavored contractual choice of law clauses.124  Courts generally
resolved multistate contract disputes under a territorial approach,
applying the law of the jurisdiction where the contract was made,
or, in some cases, the law of the jurisdiction where performance
took place. 125 To allow parties to select the law that would govern
their agreement seemed an affront to sovereignty. If parties could
select their own law, they would become a sort of private
legislature, a result traditional scholars found "absolutely
anomalous."126
With the increased importance of international commerce, the
traditional resistance to choice of law clauses has gradually
weakened, and today such clauses are presumptively
120 Cf Trebilcock, supra note 91, at 255 (noting lawyers' temptation "to exaggerate the
importance of law (or marginal changes in it) in shaping basic patterns of human
conduct"). The relationship between law and social norms has drawn much recent
scholarly attention. See Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax
Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV. 1781, 1781 & n.2 (2000) (discussing scholarship); see generally
Symposium, The Legal Construction of Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1603 (2000). For an
interesting recent discussion of the complexity of the relationship, see Robert E. Scott,
The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1603 (2000).
2' For discussions of the ways in which law can influence social norms, see, for
example, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Limits of Social Norms, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1537,
1538-39, 1544 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Value of Law, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 2021, 2026 (1996) (same).
122 In cases of abuse, the law could provide for restraining orders or for earlier
termination of the marriage. See Scott, supra note 97, at 1962 & n.166.
123 See Stewart E. Sterk, The Marginal Relevance of Choice of Law Theory, 142 U. PA.
L. REV. 949, 962 (1994) (explaining that "[a]cceptance of party autonomy as a principle
for resolving choice of law problems is one of the major successes of modern conflicts
theory").
124 See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES
COURTS 653 (3d ed. 1996).
125 See id. at 664-65; see also RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 332, 358 (1934).
126 JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332.2, at 1079-80
(1935); see also Sterk, supra note 123, at 965 (discussing Beale's objections).
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enforceable.'27 In multi-jurisdictional transactions, choice of law
clauses promote certainty and predictability, "mak[ing] it possible
for [the parties] to foretell with accuracy" what their rights and
duties will be. 2  Accordingly, contemporary courts honor the
parties' selection unless, in the words of the Restatement (Second)
of Conflict of Laws, the parties have unreasonably chosen the law
of a state that lacks a "substantial relationship to the parties or the
transaction" or a law that is "contrary to a fundamental policy of a
state which has a materially greater interest . . . in the
determination of the particular issue.' ' 29
Several contributors to Fall and Rise applaud this greater
openness to choice of law clauses. 3 ° For example, in the context of
the United States federal system, Bruce Kobayashi and Larry
Ribstein argue that allowing parties to choose their own law
encourages the enactment of efficient regulations.'3' Their
argument follows from the insights of public choice theory.
Because of interest group pressures, they write, a particular state
may enact an inefficient regulation that imposes a
127 See BORN, supra note 124, at 654; see also Sterk, supra note 123, at 962-63
(discussing "[a]cceptance of party autonomy as a principle for resolving choice of law
problems"); cf Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996
Sup. Cr. REV. 331, 332 (discussing Supreme Court's "impulse... to encourage
international trade by enforcing dispute resolution provisions in international commercial
contracts"); Friedrich K. Juenger, Contract Choice of Law in the Americas, 45 AM. J.
COMp. L. 195, 195-96 (1997) (arguing that choice of law clauses are essential for the
conduct of international trade).
128 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. e (1971); see also Erin
Ann O'Hara, Opting Out of Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis of Contractual Choice
of Law, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1551, 1560, 1569 (2000) (discussing how choice of law clauses
promote certainty and predictability).
129 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2). The description in the
text applies where the issue is "one which the parties could not have resolved by an
explicit provision in their agreement." Id. Where the issue is one that the parties could
have resolved by explicit provision, their choice of law will be honored without exception
on an incorporation-by-reference rationale. See id. § 187(1) & cmt. c.
The Restatement's formulation has received wide acceptance. See BORN, supra
note 124, at 654, 655; Sterk, supra note 123, at 964. For a discussion of the sort of policies
that qualify as "fundamental" for these purposes, see infra text accompanying notes 155-
57.
130 See, e.g., Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Contract and Jurisdictional
Freedom, in FALL AND RISE, supra note 16, at 325; Geoffrey P. Miller, Choice of Law as a
Precommitment Device, in FALL AND RISE, supra note 16, at 357, 369; Robert K.
Rasmussen, Free Contracting in Bankruptcy at Home and Abroad, in FALL AND RISE,
supra note 16, at 311, 321-24; Roberta Romano, Corporate Law as the Paradigm for
Contractual Choice of Law, in FALL AND RISE, supra note 16, at 370, 386.
131 Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 130, at 325-27. Ribstein has addressed this idea
further in a recent article written with Erin O'Hara. See Erin A. O'Hara & Larry E.
Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 1151, 1154
(2000).
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disproportionate burden on certain firms.'32 Although these firms
have an incentive to move to other states that have more efficient
laws, the cost of exit likely will be high. 3 3 Choice of law clauses
decrease the cost of exit, however, allowing the firms to escape the
inefficient regulation without actually transferring operations.34
Ultimately, the interest group pressures that led to the inefficient
regulation will subside: because target firms can easily avoid bad
regulations, there is little incentive for interest groups to push for
their adoption.'35
Indeed, as Kobayashi and Ribstein suggest, jurisdictional
competition for outside investment can lead to the adoption of
lenient choice of law rules.'36 States seeking to attract foreign
investment can make themselves more appealing by allowing firms
to opt out of local law.'37 As Geoffrey Miller points out in his
insightful essay, this may be a particularly useful strategy for
developing countries in the international context.'3s  Such
132 Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 130, at 326. For more on how interest groups can
secure the adoption of inefficient regulations, see John 0. McGinnis & Mark L.
Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REV. 511, 523-24 (2000).
133 See O'Hara & Ribstein, supra note 131, at 1162.
134 Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 130, at 325. Kobayashi & Ribstein concede that
enforcing choice of law clauses might also allow firms to escape good regulations, but
believe that market discipline restrains such behavior. "Although a state might try to
become a haven for miscreants," they write, "contracts that chose the state's law would be
priced accordingly." Id. at 346.
135 See id at 327, 331. But see O'Hara, supra note 128, at 1556-57 (arguing that
"[a]lthough contractual opt outs appear to eviscerate interest group transfers, sometimes
an opt out actually guarantees a transfer by making it politically palatable").
136 See Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 130, at 331-32; see also O'Hara & Ribstein,
supra note 131, at 1228. At some points, Kobayashi and Ribstein suggest that choice of
law clauses themselves promote jurisdictional competition. See Kobayashi & Ribstein,
supra note 130, at 325, 327. This seems unpersuasive. Jurisdictional competition occurs
when states have incentives to attract firms. See Romano, supra note 130, at 372. A state
that lures firms away from competing jurisdictions receives benefits in the form of
increased capital investment, revenue, and jobs. See Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating
Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal
Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1215 (1992); see also Romano, supra
note 130, at 372. If the firms stay where they are and merely choose the state's law, the
state gains none of these advantages, and the incentives for it to adopt efficient regulations
are absent. Choice of law clauses thus do not themselves promote jurisdictional
competition; jurisdictional competition promotes the enforcement of choice of law clauses.
137 Some scholars argue that jurisdictional competition will cause a "race to the
bottom" that results in inefficient regulation. For descriptions of this argument, see
Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a "Race" and Is It "To
the Bottom"?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 275 (1997), and Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal
Environmental Governance, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1495,1560 (1999). For refutations of this
view, see McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 132, at 559-61, and Revesz, supra note 136, at
1233-44.
'38 Miller, supra note 130, at 366, 368. Miller argues that choice of law clauses generally
can be understood as precommitment devices that prevent local parties and governments
from sandbagging foreign investors. See id. at 364-66.
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countries, which typically require outside investment to help
improve living standards, often lack legal systems that foreign
investors trust.139 Investors may well fear the risk of "opportunistic
action" by local governments, "up to and including the risk of
complete expropriation of the entire value of the investment."'4 °
As a result, developing countries may be able to attract necessary
capital only by permitting foreign investors "to bring their own
regulatory laws with them."'41
The conventional account of American contract law traces the
course of freedom of contract from triumph to decline to ultimate
restoration.' 42 In some respects, this account is correct. Freedom
of contract has gone in and out of fashion over time, and today it
stands as a fundamental tenet of our jurisprudence. Still, to speak
of freedom of contract's "fall" and "rise" is misleading. The
changes have not been nearly so dramatic; neither the victories nor
the defeats have been as complete as the conventional account
suggests.
We have seen how the conventional account exaggerates
freedom of contract's decline in the mid-twentieth century. As the
contributors to Fall and Rise explain, freedom of contract was
never absolute, even during the classical period, and the realists
139 See id. at 366; cf. Phillip J. McConnaughay, The Scope of Autonomy in International
Contracts and Its Relation to Economic Regulation and Development, 39 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 595, 603, 641-43 (2001) (discussing incapacity of legal institutions in
developing countries). On the role of international trade and investment in promoting
development, see McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 132, at 521-22, 554 & n.244. See also
Dan Ben-David, Trade, Growth and Disparity Among Nations, in SPECIAL STUDIES 5:
TRADE, INCOME DISPARITY AND POVERTY 11, 37-39 (World Trade Org. ed., 1999),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/presoo-e/pov2_e.pdf (suggesting that
international trade contributes to upward income convergence among nations); Michael
D. Ramsey, Acts of State and Foreign Sovereign Obligations, 39 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 1
(1998) ("Developing nations increasingly view private international investment as a
critical source of development capital, and governments around the world are actively
pursuing it.").
140 Miller, supra note 130, at 366.
141 Id. at 368. Of course, foreign investors might not trust the developing country to
enforce a choice of law clause that selects foreign law, but Miller discusses ways that the
country can give the investors "additional assurances." Id. at 367. For example, the
country might agree to submit disputes under a contract to binding arbitration by an
international organization, such as the International Center for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes. Id. at 367-68. Alternatively, the country might join international
investment treaties providing for host-country guarantees for loss from breach of contract.
Id. at 368. As Miller points out, a developing country would find it "extremely costly...
to abrogate [such] agreements." Id.
142 See supra text accompanying notes 1-14 (reviewing conventional account).
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never succeeded in wholly supplanting the principle.' 43  The
conventional account also exaggerates the extent of freedom of
contract's contemporary revival. While parties today enjoy wide
latitude in forming agreements, many contract terms remain
unenforceable because they violate judicial policies that stress
substantive fairness and overriding social values.'" I could give
several examples, but a few will suffice. 45 Courts refuse to enforce
certain "exculpatory clauses" that limit parties' tort liability,
particularly when the clauses have a negative impact on members
of a protected class like employees or residential tenants. 46 Courts
refuse to enforce contract provisions that restrict the alienation of
property,' 47 as well as those that unreasonably restrain trade, such
as broad non-competition clauses. 148  Finally, judges generally
decline to enforce terms that curtail fiduciary duties or abridge
parties' access to the courts. 49
Even in contexts where freedom of contract has expanded,
one should not overestimate the extent of parties' ability to set
their own terms. Consider marriage, for example. Contract
principles govern the marriage relationship to a much greater
degree today than they did a generation ago.' ° But contemporary
courts do not treat marriages like other contracts.'' As Katharine
143 On the limited scope of freedom of contract during the classical period, see
Alexander, supra note 40, at 103, 108, and Epstein, supra note 30, at 58-60. See also Jean
Braucher, The Afterlife of Contract, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 49, 59 (1995); Pettit, supra note 7,
at 300-52. On the limited nature of realists' attacks on freedom of contract, see Epstein,
supra note 30, at 25, 26, Posner, supra note 58, at 61, and Trebilcock, supra note 45, at 78-
79.
144 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 39, § 5.2, at 326-28; G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the
Modern Supreme Court, 81 CAL. L. REV. 431, 440-46 (1993); see also Eyal Zamir, The
Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation and Supplementation, 97 COLUM. L. REV.
1710, 1740 (1997) (discussing public policy doctrine). Courts typically sever unenforceable
terms and honor the remainder of a contract. See Mark L. Movsesian, Severability in
Statutes and Contracts, 30 GA. L. REV. 41, 46-56 (1995).
145 For a comprehensive review of these policies, see FARNSWORTH, supra note 39, §§
5.2-.5, at 326-43.
146 See id. § 5.2, at 328-29. Parties cannot agree to waive liability for intentional or
reckless torts; in employment contracts and residential leases, parties cannot waive
liability for negligence. Id.
147 See id. § 5.2, at 327.
148 See id. § 5.3, at 331-37; Zamir, supra note 144, at 1740.
149 See Shell, supra note 144, at 441.
'50 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
151 See supra text accompanying notes 106-07. Parties apparently share this reluctance
to treat marriages like contracts: "private marriage contracts tailored to individual needs
and desires remain uncommon among first-time newlyweds." Eric Rasmusen & Jeffrey
Evans Stake, Lifting the Veil of Ignorance: Personalizing the Marriage Contract, 73 IND.
L.J. 453, 461 (1998); see also Ellman, supra note 106, at 1367 (noting that few married
couples make contracts to govern their relationship); Nock, supra note 106, at 1980
(arguing that "marriage is probably not best viewed as a contract because this is not how it
is experienced" by married couples).
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Silbaugh has recently shown, the picture is a good deal more
complicated.1 2  While courts generally honor antenuptial
agreements that relate to alimony and the distribution of property
on divorce, they "are extremely reluctant to enforce provisions
dealing with anything else," including the division of labor within
the marriage, the ability of the parties to seek divorce, and the
religious upbringing of children.1 53  Even with respect to
agreements concerning alimony and property, courts conduct a
heightened review for procedural and substantive fairness, using
standards more stringent than those they apply in
unconscionability cases.5 4
Conflict of laws displays a similar pattern. While parties
generally can choose the law that governs their transaction,
significant limits exist. As I have explained, courts will not enforce
a choice of law clause that selects a foreign law that is "contrary to
a fundamental policy" of the forum state.'5 5 For example, courts
have refused to enforce choice of law clauses that upset local rules
on employment, government corruption, and insurance. 6 To be
sure, "fundamental policy" is not an exact category, and courts
have disagreed about whether this or that policy falls within the
exception.5 7  The fact that the exception exists at all, however,
demonstrates that courts remain unwilling to allow parties to
displace rules that seem essential to overriding public values.
The fact that freedom of contract continues to share the stage
with competing principles should come as no surprise. Law always
reflects a community's values, and American contract law reflects
the continuing conflict in our society between individual freedom
152 Silbaugh, supra note 103, at 70-92.
153 Id. at 78; see also id. at 76-92.
'-' See id. at 74-76; see also Regan, supra note 81, at 638 (explaining that courts often do
not show marital contracts the same "deference... they accord conventional commercial
contracts"). But cf Brian Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of Love. The Enforcement of
Premarital Agreements and How We Think About Marriage, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv.
145, 158 (1998) (arguing that there exists "[a]n almost even split among the
jurisdictions.., on the procedural and substantive fairness elements of [antenuptial]
agreements, with the slight majority probably willing to enforce with few or no
requirements on those elements").
155 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2). For further discussion,
see supra text accompanying note 129.
156 See BORN, supra note 124, at 656. Likewise, courts have refused to honor choice of
law clauses that appear in adhesion contracts. See Sterk, supra note 123, at 964.
157 See Larry E. Ribstein, Choosing Law by Contract, 18 J. CORP. L. 245, 264-66 (1993);
Russell J. Weintraub, "At Least, Do No Harm": Does the Second Restatement of Conflicts
Meet the Hippocratic Standard?, 56 MD. L. REv. 1284, 1292-98 (1997). The Restatement
commentary states that a fundamental policy must be "substantial," and gives as examples
policies embodied in statutes that make certain kinds of contracts illegal. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. g.
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and public control. 58 This conflict is unavoidable in a liberal
democracy like ours and grand theories can do little to resolve it.
The best the law can do is fashion reasonable compromises on a
case-by-case basis. 59 The nature of these compromises will change
over time as society's interests evolve; freedom of contract will
expand in some areas and recede in others.' 6° As long as
Americans remain committed both to autonomy and public order,
however, our law of contract will be marked by a profound and
inescapable tension.
Fall and Rise makes a useful contribution to the literature.
The book's demonstration of freedom of contract's enduring
strength is engaging and in many ways compelling. Still, in
discussing trends in contract law, a bit of caution is always in order.
Just as scholars were too quick to dismiss freedom of contract a
generation ago, we may be too quick to celebrate its triumph over
rival principles today. In contract law, "rises" and "falls" are
always muted. More than anything else, the history of contract law
demonstrates the truth of Morris Cohen's insightful observation:
"the roots of the law of contract are many rather than one. 161
158 See GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 110 (1977); see also Kessler,
supra note 2, at 2, reprinted in A CONTRACTS ANTHOLOGY, supra note 2, at 32.
159 See Trebilcock, supra note 45, at 92-93; see also MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM
AND FREEDOM 34 (1962) (arguing that no easy formula can resolve the tensions between
individual freedom and social control); HILLMAN, supra note 27, at 269 ("[Clontract law
flourishes largely because it is the fruit of the legal system's reasonable and practical
compromises over conflicting values and interests in a diverse society."); cf Williston,
supra note 35, at 374 ("Observation of results has proved that unlimited freedom of
contract, like unlimited freedom in other directions, does not necessarily lead to public or
individual welfare and that the only ultimate test of proper limitations is that provided by
experience.").
160 See Kessler, supra note 2, at 17, reprinted in A CONTRACTS ANTHOLOGY, supra
note 2, at 38; Pettit, supra note 7, at 352.
161 Cohen, supra note 29, at 591.
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